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Section 1
Introduction

In light o f the increasing flow o f millions o f dollars into the sports industry during the last
two decades, notably the international soccer market, the repercussions from the wave o f
economic activity have come under scrutiny by economists. In France alone, while the real Gross
Domestic Product for the country has grown at an annualized rate o f 2.75%, the soccer industry
in France has experienced a 500% growth in ticket sales, 3,300% growth in sponsorship income,
122,000% increase in income from television contracts overall during the same time period
(Bourg and Gouget, 2005). Sports have become such a pivotal facet o f the economic structure
due to their status as an integral part o f today’s society with upwards o f 20% o f French citizens
partaking in licensed athletic events and 75% claiming to be participants in sporting activities,
both professional and recreational. It has been increasingly evident that the actions taken by
professional sports teams have a far reaching impact on the global market. For the 2008-2009
season the combined budget o f the teams in Europe’s top five leagues (England, France, Italy,
Germany and Spain) reached a level o f $7.9 billion, a figure that continues to grow from year to
year (Deloitte, 2010). Evidence o f this drastic increase in economic activity can be seen by the
recent introductions o f more than 40 professional soccer teams into various capital markets. The
vast majority o f the teams who have introduced capital stock into trading markets are British
teams, since the practice was just recently put in place in France. Only two French teams have
tested the market thus far, with Olympique Lyon and FC Istres being the first. Another trend in
the funding o f professional soccer teams is privatization with the purchasing o f clubs by
enterprises and billionaire investors for record setting amounts. Examples include the recent
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acquisition o f French team Paris Saint-Germain in 2011 by the billionaire investment group QIA
and the purchase o f English side Manchester City by Abu Dhabi United Group in 2008. Lastly,
the drastic growth in the soccer market can be attributed to the globalization o f the sport and
increased revenues through national and international television and sponsorship contracts. All o f
these actions have had a hand in not only improving revenues for the teams involved, but in
increasing the fees paid for the transferring o f players and the wages that professional soccer
players receive annually. This research seeks to quantify the determinants o f a modern soccer
player’s market value when being transferred within the country o f France while taking into
consideration the ramifications at a macro level o f an ever increasing and globalized sports
economy.
The purpose o f this research is to analyze the changes that have transpired in the French
Ligue 1 transfer market in the post-Bosman ruling era and to estimate a statistical model using
the ordinary least squares regression method that estimates the market value o f a player in the
French sector o f the international player transfer market. The independent variables will be a
combination o f statistics from the player’s in game performance and personal data, the
characteristics o f the purchasing clubs, and the characteristics o f the selling clubs. The transfer
market o f soccer players is an international market established by the governing body, FIFA
(Federation Internationale de Football Association), which allows the member clubs to
participate in an active market for the buying and selling o f their players twice a year in JulyAugust and again in January. In the last twenty years numerous academic studies have been
published focusing on the viability o f the soccer transfer market as an economic market similar
to other traditional trading markets, with much research devoted to the determination o f players’
market values. However, little research has been done on the French sector o f the transfer
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market, with studies traditionally focusing on the English and German sectors o f the market. This
study will be based on the modern theory on the transfer market and take into account recent
developments such as the existence o f monopoly rents (Dobson et al., 1999), the superstar effect
(Franck et al., 2008) and the ramifications o f the Bosnian ruling. These subjects will be further
discussed later in Section II o f this paper. The international transfer market and soccer economy
have both undergone numerous changes during the last twenty-five years, which have led to an
increasing amount o f leniency on the part o f the governing bodies and have liberalized the
business. This, in turn, has created a lucrative and attractive industry conducive to growing
revenues that has enticed the placement o f new capital into soccer teams and players. This wave
o f liberalization and influx o f large amounts o f capital into the soccer market, both in France and
abroad, has allowed the transfer market to grow to the size that it is today, with £190 million
being spent in 2011 alone by French teams on the transferring o f players to teams in the Ligue 1.
The paper will be structured in the following manner. Relevant existing literature on the
topics o f the foundation of French professional soccer and recent developments in the transfer
market is presented in Section II. Special attention will be given in this section to the expansion
o f the French soccer transfer market on the macro level, and the changes in the business o f
soccer in France, including the Bosnian ruling, that have allowed for the increase in transfer
prices. Section III will present the data to be used, discuss the hypothesized results, and present
the regression model for the empirical study. The results from the empirical study will be
highlighted and discussed in Section IV and Section V will serve as the conclusion and highlight
further research opportunities.
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Section 2
Literature Review
The literature review section o f this paper consists o f three separate subsections due to
the breadth o f the topics being discussed. The first section, Section 2.1, will serve as a review o f
the history o f the French Ligue 1, discussing the evolutions o f the corporate structure o f teams
and the structure o f the transfer market. This section will also explore the 1995 landmark
Bosman ruling. The following section, Section 2.2, will discuss the current literature concerning
the growth in the overall soccer transfer market. This macro approach explains the evolution o f
the revenues o f clubs during the last 20 years which have led to the increase o f transfer fees.
Lastly, Section 2.3 will focus on the micro aspect o f the transfer market and will compare
literature that is directly related to the empirical study that will be executed in subsequent
sections o f the paper.

2.1 Development o f Football in France
Professional soccer made its first appearance in 19th century England with the creation o f
the first association, the Football Association (FA). The FA arose in 1863, with the member
clubs seeking to band together in order to create common rules and to promote the playing o f the
fledgling game (Drut, 2011). Despite the fact that the first clubs were still considered amateur,
they were able to see the potential for revenue in the sport through the sale o f tickets to the
matches. In 1885, in order to foster transparency and avoid the scandals that had been frequent
during the days o f amateurism, the Football Association officially instituted professionalism and
created the world’s first professional soccer league. While soccer first crossed the English
Channel to France with the creation o f Le Havre AC in 1872, it would be another sixty years
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before France would follow the growing trend o f professionalism, with the French soccer teams
remaining amateur clubs until 1932. At the turn o f the century, soccer in France was still not
widely accepted by the citizens o f the Republique. The sport, mostly played by the bourgeoisie
and lower social classes in France, was frowned upon by the upper classes. With the
remuneration o f players being considered, “inelegant and vulgar,” it is clear why French society
did not make the switch from amateurism to professionalism until after most o f the other
European states. (Drut, 2011)
French professional soccer took a setback during the invasion by Germany and the onset
o f World War II. The Vichy government mimicked the sentiments o f the upper class French
society, rendering professionalism illegal stating that the career as a professional soccer player
was, “decadent and immoral.” While soccer was played in Vichy France and by French soccer
players in exile in England, it was not until the liberation o f France by Allied forces in 1945 that
a professional league was restored in the Republique. With the creation o f the Groupement des
Clubs Autorises (Group o f Authorized Clubs), certain clubs were picked by the league creators to
join as professional teams, allowing the remuneration o f players. A distinct separation between
the group o f professional teams, the Ligue de Football Professionnel (LFP), which exists in
perpetuity today, and the amateur leagues, would last until 1970. Then, in 1970, a link was
created between the LFP and the teams o f the lower leagues o f the Federation de Football
Franqaise (FFF) allowing for the promotion and relegation o f teams between Ligue 1 and Ligue
2, which are the two professional leagues o f the LFP, and the amateur leagues o f the FFF. The
FFF is now France’s governing body that oversees all aspects o f its member teams which include
the teams o f the LFP, lower division teams that comprise the departmental and regional leagues,
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and France’s National Team structure which represents the country in all national team
competitions.
In the last forty years, the evolution o f the commercial status o f teams has contributed to
increased capital and allowed for the teams in France to gain increasing revenues and profits.
Originally, the teams in France were considered by the government as associations o f the Law o f
1901, which labeled the teams as but non lucrative (nonprofit). It was not until 1975 that the first
commercialization arrived in French football at the team level. In 1975, a law allowed teams to
pass from Associations a but non lucrative to Société D’économie Mixte Locoale (semi-public
company), which allowed teams to receive both public funding from local entities, such as
departmental, regional, and municipal government, while also maintaining private investment.
The teams however were not allowed to be publicly traded. After a succession o f failed attempts
by the French government to effectively liberalize the professional team structure, a new law was
passed in 1999 which allowed the teams o f the LFP to become highly attractive investments. In
1999, the status o f Société Anonyme Sportive Professionnel (SASP) ushered into French
professional soccer a new era o f expanded rights very similar to traditional companies and
corporations. The new corporate structure enticed outside investment as the law authorized teams
to both pay dividends and salary to the directors o f the club. In contrast to the other forms o f
structure, the financial capital o f an SASP team is not restricted to a fixed limit. The creation of
the SASP structure was extremely important in the evolution o f professional soccer as the teams
approached the economic idea of a rational enterprise, whose objective, “according to
neoclassical theory is to maximize profits,” (Drut, 2011). As noted by Drut (2011), as o f the
2011 season, all forty teams o f the LFP and six teams located in the highest division o f the FFF
structure, Ligue National, have professional status. Likewise, o f the twenty teams in the top
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flight league, Ligue 1, only two teams, Auxerre and Ajaccio, do not have SASP status as both are
associations. As the restraints were loosened on the French professional teams, their corporate
structure became increasingly attractive for private investors, which has already been highlighted
by the recent landmark purchase o f Paris St. Germain by QIA.
In 1995, a landmark court ruling by the European Court o f Justice changed the face o f the
soccer transfer market. Prior to this decision, a player was bound to the team for which he
played, due to the fact that the team held their professional registration. A player was not allowed
to play for another team unless that player’s registration was purchased or transferred to another
team. A problem arose in 1990 when Jean-Marc Bosnian, a player for RFC Liege in Belgium,
had his contract expire with no negotiated extension. At the end o f his contract, it became
apparent that RFC Liege no longer wanted the services o f Bosnian. However, the only team
willing to purchase him, French team USL Dunkerque, was unwilling to pay the transfer fee
demanded by RCL Liege for the transfer o f Bosnian. Since Bosnian was unable to transfer
teams, RCL Liege cut his pay and dropped him down from their top flight team, with Bosman
being unable to join any other professional teams. Bosman soon brought suit against RCL Liege
in a case that was brought before the European Court o f Justice, citing restrict o f trade as being
infringed upon by the Belgian team.
The outcomes o f the court ruling have permanently changed the nature o f the European
transfer market. The court ruled that any team restricting the movement o f a citizen o f the
European Union at the end o f their contract was in violation o f article 48 o f the Treaty o f Rome.
This portion o f the document guarantees the right to free movement o f workers for European
citizens between two member states o f the European Union. The ruling created in European
soccer a free agent market for when player’s contracts have ended. While this has been a staple
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part of American sports for a long time, the idea was brand new at its inception for Europe. The
change for the transfer market comes in the form o f free transfers once a player’s contract ends,
since the team no longer controls his registration. This has led to teams being forced to sell their
players earlier in their contracts and possibly for a lower price than their perceived value for the
player in an attempt to realize some value from their investment before the expiration o f the
contract. Numerous studies have been done highlighting the outcomes o f the Bosnian ruling,
with the majority highlighting that globally transfer fees will see a rise due to increased
competition o f teams for the players. Drut (2011) highlights that the rate o f transfer for
individual players has increased after the ruling. This has allowed superstar players to demand
higher wages with the increased competition amongst teams. The interaction between time left
on a player’s contract and the transfer fee has however not yet been explored due to the
nondisclosure o f contract information o f soccer players.
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2.2 Macro Literature Review

In 2009, a transfer fee o f £80 million was paid by Spanish team Real Madrid for the
transfer o f then Manchester United forward and Portuguese national, Cristiano Ronaldo,
eclipsing the previous international record o f £53 million paid by Real Madrid for French
midfielder, Zinedine Zidane in 2001. Instantly, a debate started over whether Real Madrid had
over paid for the player’s ability and if the overall increase in transfer prices was sustainable and
beneficial to the soccer economy as a whole. While the economies o f the European Union were
dealing with the worst national debt crisis in history and a recession that had plagued economic
growth following the 2008 economic downturn, the soccer industry appeared to be continuing to
grow. In fact, 11 o f the top 20 transfers o f all-time, when adjusted for inflation, transpired
between the years o f 2008 and 2011. In France, Paris St. Germain, after the acquisition by the
new Qatari management, paid a French team record o f £36.6 million in 2011 for their newest
superstar, the Argentinian midfielder, Javier Pastore. While the consumption o f items such as
match tickets, traditionally a team ’s main source o f revenue, are thought to be income elastic due
to their status as luxury goods, the recent increase in transfer fees paid would suggest that the
soccer industry has become recession proof with a diversification o f their revenue while allowing
teams to continue bidding higher prices for new soccer talent.
On a macro level, according to Drat (2011), the overall increase in the magnitude o f
transfers can be attributed to three major sectors o f a soccer team ’s revenue making ventures.
Traditionally, a soccer team ’s main revenue source has been the gate ticket sales. For the 20032004 season, Manchester United, an English Premiere league team, attributed 40% o f their
annual revenue to ticket sales, representing the largest portion o f their income (Bourg and
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Gouguet, 2006). However, in France, the importance o f the gate sales has diminished as income
from television sponsorships, merchandising and advertising sponsors have grown to be the most
important source o f income. In comparison, Olympique Marseille, a team o f the French Ligue 1,
attributed 16% o f their revenue from soccer operations to ticket sales for 2010-2011 season. For
the teams o f the French Ligue 1, income from television contracts has changed drastically over
the past twenty years. For the 1997 season, 25% o f a team ’s revenue was linked to TV contracts,
while the same teams had 52% o f their revenue derived from the TV contracts for the 2003-2004
season. This number has approached 60% for the most recent seasons. Table 1 shows the
evolution o f television contracts over the last 30 years with an increase from € .8 million in 1983
to the present contract o f €650 million negotiated in 2007-2008. Drut (2011) argues that these
staunch increases in television contracts have been a direct determinant o f the increased fees paid
for the transfer o f players. As is presented in the following section, research has been conducted
that links the profit o f a team to the price it pays for a player in the transfer market. Drut (2011)
also argues in his book that the disparity in team s’ revenues are due to many achievement based
earnings, such as the UEFA Champions League, advertising money, and merchandising deals.
Along with the relegation-promotion league structure these have led to great disparities between
the top tier and lower tier teams, allowing the top tier teams to continue to perform better in a
more costly transfer market.
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Table I

Negiotated Television Contract in Real Euros
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One example o f such performance based incentives is the allocation o f television
contracts. For the 2010 season, the French Ligue 1 champion, Marseille, received as part o f the
television rights contract with the LFP €50.8 million, o f which €17.9 million were given due to
their performance from the prior year. The three new teams that were promoted to the Ligue 1
for the 2010 season received zero compensation for the year before, and thus were the lowest
compensated teams through the television contract with €14 million total each for Le Mans,
Boulogne-Sur-Mer, and Grenoble. As part o f the contract, teams also receive an unequally
weighted portion based on their notoriety as a team. Auxerre, who finished in 3rd place, but is
located in a small market region, received only €2.8 million extra, while Paris St. Germain, who
finished a lowly 13th place, but is located in the lucrative television market o f Paris, received an
additional €12.9 million for their notoriety, (Drut, 2011). With the larger market teams and the
teams who perform best each year receiving a much larger amount o f money, these teams are
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able to purchase the best players in the transfer market, thus perpetuating their domination o f the
league. In France, and in most major European professional soccer leagues, there is a system o f
promotion and relegation, where each year the last 3 teams in the Ligue 1 are relegated down to
Ligue 2, a lower competition level with much lower revenues, and the first 3 teams o f Ligue 2
are promoted to join the Ligue 1 teams. With the current revenue structure very few promoted
teams are able to compete on a consistent basis with the established Ligue 1 teams due to a large
disparity in income and thus caliber o f players. Between the years o f 1990 and 2010, in France,
63% o f the seasons were won by the same three teams, (Lyon, Marseille and Bordeaux). This
trend o f domination amongst a few teams is common in Europe. In Scotland and Greece, three
teams have won the championship every year during the same time period, while Portugal,
Turkey, England, Spain, and the Netherlands each have had 90% or more o f their seasons won
by the same three teams, (Drut, 2011). The presented facts demonstrate how the revenue
structure from television contracts and the league formation with promotion and relegation has
led to a competitive imbalance as the perpetual champions are able to continue paying the
increasing transfer prices for the most skilled players.
Other performance-based disparities that have raised the revenue o f the league’s top
teams include the UEFA Champions League and merchandising revenues. The Champions
League is a yearly tournament that matches the champions from all the leagues in European
countries plus an allotted number of teams from various leagues in Europe. For example in
France, the champion and the next two finishers qualify for the Champions League, while in
England, due to a stronger field o f teams, the champion and the next three finishers qualify for
the tournament. A country with a low level professional league such as Liechtenstein can only
qualify one team in the tournament. For the 2009-2010 season €746 million were paid to the
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thirty two clubs who qualified for the opening rounds o f the Champions League. This money is
added to the already skewed revenues o f the teams who are performing well. Teams earn
additional revenue for winning games as they progress through the tournament, with the winner
earning €19.3 million for the final game. In France, during the ten year span from 2000-2010,
Olympique Lyon appeared in every edition o f the Champions League, which generated a total o f
225.4 million euro, which averages to 22.5 million euro a year. Other teams in France such as
Marseille and Bordeaux were able to earn over 80 million euros during the same span. Not
surprisingly, these are the same three aforementioned teams who won the majority o f league
titles during a twenty year period. Merchandising revenues have been linked to a team ’s
location, due to the potential population o f fans, and the number o f celebrity soccer players on
the team. Even though merchandising revenues only constitute about 10% o f a team ’s budget in
the Ligue 1, there are still significant discrepancies between top and bottom flight teams that
affect the ability to pay the higher transfer fees. In 2009, when Real Madrid purchased Cristiano
Ronaldo from Manchester United, the team was able to recuperate a large portion o f the €94
million fee that it paid by selling 1.2 million jerseys o f the new celebrity for a price o f €85 a
piece, o f which 30% was profit. This yields around €30.6 million for Real Madrid, a large
portion o f the fee paid for Ronaldo. Such financing tools however are only valuable to teams that
have a large enough fan base and are capable o f attracting celebrity star players. The teams that
are capable o f attracting such players are the teams that are consistently winning, thus
perpetuating the performance gap. A similar situation to Real M adrid’s merchandise financing
can be expected with the recent purchase o f fan-favorite Javier Pastore by Paris St.-Germain in
the large market o f Paris. Further research will have to be conducted however as his first year at
the club has not yet been completed.
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2.3 Micro Literature Review
At a micro level, research on the determination o f players’ individual transfer fees has
become increasingly available as the field grows. Tough competition amongst teams vying for
the same limited skilled capital, in this case the superstars o f the soccer world, has prompted an
expansion in the attempts to accurately value players and to seek to identify the qualities that
determine the values. Dobson and Gerrard (1999) and Carmichael et al. (1999) are two o f the
more recent papers that attempt to create empirical formulas to derive a player’s market value.
Their research however has been solely focused on the players in the English divisions o f soccer.
This study will fill a gap in academic research by creating a study on the French sector o f the
transfer market. Likewise, a variety o f studies have been conducted on nontraditional aspects of
the market. Reilly and Witt (1995) looked for, but found no evidence of, racial discrimination in
the amount paid for the transfer o f players in English soccer. Torgler and Schmidt (2007)
searched the Bundesliga, German professional soccer league, for evidence o f increased
performance as a function o f increased absolute or relative income finding a non-linear
relationship between pay and performance. Lastly, Franck and Nuesch (2008) searched the
Bundesliga to find the determinants o f superstar formation in finding that both on-field
performance and the cultivation o f popularity through media sources and other outlets add to a
player’s star quality.
The soccer transfer market fulfills two major roles in the international soccer world.
According to Carmichael and Thomas (1993), the role o f the transfer market is, “to facilitate and
organize the acquisition and exchange o f players by the clubs to enable the reconstitution o f
teams with the aim o f increasing playing strengths...and to facilitate the movement o f players
between clubs in their search for better opportunities, higher earnings, and increased job
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satisfaction.” The soccer transfer market however differs when compared to the American
method o f player movement. In American sports, traditionally, players are traded from one team
to another in return for a combination o f other players, draft picks, and in rare cases, monetary
compensation. The soccer transfer market operates mostly in a cash for player method, where
one team makes a cash offer for the contracted player o f another team. During two time
windows, July 1st through midnight August 31st and January 1st through midnight January 31st,
teams are free to enter into negotiations for the transfer o f players. For a player who is currently
under contract by a team, the potential buying team must approach the selling team directly in
negotiations over a transfer price. Once the two teams come to an agreement, the buying team is
allowed to speak to the player concerning salary figures. Either the team or the player has the
right to reject a transfer, at which point the transfer will not take place. Also, players may
undergo temporary transfers in which the player is loaned to another team for 1, 3, 6, or 12
months, with the buying club often paying the salary commitments for the loan period. The flow
o f players from different countries and continents is common as many players play in countries
different from their home country. Some leagues such as the Major League Soccer in the United
States and the English Premiere League have tried to take measures to limit the impact o f nonnationals by creating quotas for players from the home country on the rosters o f teams. As
mentioned before, the Bosman ruling o f 1995 guarantees the free flow o f European Union
citizens for employment purposes within the European Union, but the quota for non-citizens is
created by the individual leagues. In order to promote fairness and to limit disputes the transfer
market is highly regulated by FIFA and the individual national organizations.
In order to best understand the transfer o f players in the transfer market it is important to
consider that soccer teams act as rational decision makers in the transfer market, searching to
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maximize profits, both financial and performance based, when looking to restructure their team.
While the field has yet to be explored extensively, a debate has surfaced between two different
schools o f thought on the correct way to determine the value o f players. Articles have been
written by Carmichael and Thomas (1993), Reilly and Witt (1995), Dobson and Gerrard (1999),
and Dobson, et al (2000) that focus on the estimation techniques on a bilateral monopoly
bargaining model within a Nash-bargaining framework. Carmichael and Thomas (1993) note
that, “the evaluation o f any player would be expected to be based on player characteristic criteria
which would include age, experience, playing record, star quality, together with a number of
subjective factors such as potential. The fee paid should be based on the present value o f the
future expected rents to be earned by the club from the player’s employment during the period of
the contract.” When two profit maximizing teams enter into negotiations, there are numerous
acceptable choices for the final transfer fee that would satisfy both teams. The resulting
negotiated fee is thus the product o f a negotiation that falls between the maximum amount of
money that the buying team is willing to pay for the player and the reservation price, or
minimum amount for which the selling team is willing to part with the player. A two-person
Nash-bargaining model, as stated in Nash (1950), is characterized by two individuals who are
both assumed to be highly rational, able to accurately compare their desires, and have equal
bargaining skills and knowledge o f the opposite individual. With the institution o f fair financial
practices in FIFA and increased transparency in the world soccer market, it is assumed that teams
meet the qualities demanded o f a Nash equilibrium. In order to quantify the relative bargaining
strengths o f the two teams, the inclusion o f characteristics for both the buying and selling team
are necessary in the model. Variables that capture playing success, attendance, and financial
standing were found to be statistically significant in all o f the studies.
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Dobson and Gerrard (1999), which focuses on the players o f the English Football
Association and Dobson et al. (2000), which focuses on the teams that are not in the top four
leagues o f English football, vary slightly from the other aforementioned article in their approach
to the bargaining model in that they search for evidence o f monopoly rents present in the
determination o f transfer fees. As explained in Dobson et al. (2000), “Monopoly rents are present
when the selling club extracts some o f the excess o f the buying club’s net valuation o f a player
over the selling club’s reservation price.” A club’s reservation price is the lowest price for which
it is willing to sell its player. The inclusion o f monopoly rents shows that the potential price for
the player will lie on a span between the vectors for the buying and selling clubs, with the
vectors being a function o f player characteristics and the respective club characteristics. This
reaffirms the models used previously in the Carmichael and Thomas (1993) and Reilly and Witt
(1995) articles. The results showing monopoly rents in English Premiere football through the
two studies can be assumed to apply directly to the transfer market in French soccer, therefore
the model used in this study will be similar in construction to the model used in the previous
studies.
The results found in Dobson and Gerrard (1999) and Dobson et al. (2000) show
significant impact o f the variables included in their research on the dependent variable, the
transfer price. The first study searches for the impact o f these variables in the top four leagues of
English soccer (called league football) while the second is a similar study that proves a similar
relationship for the variables in the non-league sector o f English professional football. Dobson
and Gerrard (1999) were able to attribute just over 79% o f the variation in the transfer prices o f
English league players to the variables included in the model. This high level o f systematic
variation in the determination of transfer fees reiterates the importance o f the variables in
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determining a player’s market value. All o f the variables that accounted for the player’s current
form and personal characteristics were found to be significant at the .05 level or better. For the
variables concerning the clubs, the characteristics o f the buying club were found to be significant
at the .05 level while only the selling team ’s league position in the year prior to the transfer and
the selling team ’s goal difference in the preceding year were found to be significant. The
significance o f the buying club’s variables serves as evidence o f monopoly rents. With the joint
significance o f the buying team ’s variables with the selling team ’s variables, it can be concluded
based on the theoretical evidence presented in Dobson and Gerrard (1999) that the selling team
does indeed extract monopoly rents in the market, thus making the transfer price o f a player a
function o f the player’s characteristics and both clubs’ variables.
In contrast to the aforementioned studies, Carmichael et al. (1999) use a different
approach from the previous bargaining models to establish their quantitative study. The authors
argue that the previous studies failed to address the determinants o f player mobility, which for
the season covered in the study was a rarity with only 12.3 percent o f the population being
transferred. The authors state that with a subsection o f the population being more likely to
transfer than another, the players who are transferred are not part o f a random sample, but yet
possess skills that influence the fee paid by the buying club and make their transfer atypical.
Since there exists a section o f the population that is more likely to be transferred the authors
write that an equation that uses Ordinary Least Squared estimation techniques will suffer from
selection bias, which could lead to inconsistent and biased coefficients. The model employed
utilizes the Heckman two-step technique which calls for a preliminary equation which
determines the likelihood o f a player’s transfer. The residuals from this equation are then
employed to try to correct for any selection bias found in the secondary equation, which is the
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transfer fee determining model. As noted in Dobson and Gerrard (1999), this model has come
under scrutiny for its departure from the bargaining and competition models previously
employed. Dobson and Gerrard (1999) respond by suggesting that the selection-correction
model, as the Carmichael et al. (1999) model is referred to, suffers from the exclusion o f the
buying team ’s characteristics in the preliminary model o f the Heckman two-step process. In the
preliminary step o f the model, all players, both those who were transferred and those who were
not, are included in the data set in order to determine the likelihood o f a player’s transfer. The
model does suggest that team characteristics do have an impact on the likeliness o f a player to be
transferred. However due to the inclusion o f players who were not transferred during the period,
characteristics for the buying club could not be included since these players do not have any
purchasing club. It is suggested by Dobson and Gerrard (1999) that the effects o f the buying club
characteristics will be observed in the estimation o f the transferred players, but that the exclusion
o f these variables from the preliminary model will cause model misspecification errors when the
selection-correction model is constructed in the second portion o f the process. It is for this reason
that this method has not been employed in the specification o f the model for this paper.
The results for the fee determinant equation o f the two-step Heckman process used in
Carmichael et al. (1999), yield similar results to the model in Dobson and Gerrard (1999).
Variables for age were significant showing a negative parabola for the fit o f the data. Likewise,
experience in the league in previous years was significant and had a positive coefficient. Goals
scored in both the league and one o f the national tournaments was significant with a positive
impact on the transfer price o f the individual player. As in the study by Dobson and Gerrard
(1999), international team experience was linked to a higher transfer price at the full national
team level, not the youth team squad level. One difference between the two models was that in
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the study by Dobson and Gerrard (1999), the positional dummy variables for the three major
positions (forward, midfielder, and defense) were statistically significant, whereas in the
Carmichael et al. (1999) study, the dummy variables were not shown to be significant. Overall
the explanatory power of the Carmichael et al. (1999) model was relatively low with 41% o f the
change in transfer fees explained by the included variables. This is well below the .79 R2
reported by Dobson and Gerrard (1999), and is most likely due to the exclusion o f data
accounting for the impact of the two clubs involved in the transfer.
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Section 3

For the quantitative portion o f this research, I constructed a micro level study o f transfer
prices using 3 years worth o f data on players transferred between teams in the French
professional soccer leagues. In using Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis, I test the
impact that certain player and team specific variables have on the negotiated transfer fee paid for
a player. The regression uses a compilation o f individual variables for the players transferred,
including variables that represent (i) the player’s on-field performance and personal
characteristics, (ii) aspects o f the selling club, (iii) aspects o f the buying club, (iv) dummy
variables to test for the positional aspects o f the transfer. For the study, the dependent variable is
the natural logarithm o f the transfer fee negotiated between the two clubs for the purchase o f a
player (LNPrice). The form o f the natural logarithm is assumed in order to best fit the data and
to insure homoscedasticity, or a constant variance in the variables. The price listed in the data set
is the nominal price paid for the player listed in British pounds. British pounds are used in this
study due to the reporting standards o f the database used. Due to the brevity o f the time span, it
is assumed that the nominal fees will suffice in accurately determining the impact o f the
independent variables. Also, for this study, the price is reported in British pounds due to the
method o f reporting transfer prices by the website used to find the data.
The data on the French sector o f the player transfer market for the empirical study
was compiled from a German website that specializes in the compilation o f data on soccer
players.1 All variables were extracted from this website for the seasons spanning from June 1st,
2008 to January 3 1st, 2011. The three seasons included in the data represent six different transfer
windows, during which a total o f 116 unique transfers that satisfy the requirements for inclusion
1www.transfermarkt.de
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in the study took place. Only transfers between two French teams, with the buying club being a
member o f the Ligue 1 at the time o f the purchase were included in the data set to provide
consistency in the variables. The data set only includes the transfers that had a disclosed fee
reported to be greater than 0, which excludes the free transfers that take place due to the
termination o f contracts (linked to the Bosman ruling) and the rare case o f a player being
transferred for an undisclosed amount. Likewise, Goalkeepers were excluded from the set as it is
believed that their pricing is based on a separate set o f variables that differ from those o f field
players, and thus do not have a place in this empirical study. For the data set, a total o f
£347,410,000 was spent by teams, with the highest transfer o f £19,390,000 being paid for French
national Yoann Gourcuff o f Olympique Lyon. In contrast, the lowest fee recorded was £110,000
for the purchase o f the American national defender, Carlos Bocanegra by St. Etienne.
Table II-Table o f Descriptive Statistics

FULLCAP AGE
19.67
24.70

BCLP BCGD BCATT SCLP
9.75 6.76 22.78 15.30

City or Town

PRICE

Mean

2994913.79

GOLS ASSISTS MINS
2.62
24.20
4.98

Std. Dev.

3591871.16

5.56

2.99

8.83

21.81

2.97

6.01

15.30

13.62

Kurtosis

5.64

3.45

2.38

0.00

1.31

0.19

0.92

-0.60

Skew

2.32

1.75

1.51

-0.60

1.30

0.37

0.26

0.13

SCGD SCATT
0.20

17.60

9.28

14.99

11.26

-0.32

-0.26

0.26

1.12

0.76

0.63

0.24

1.26
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I chose for the set o f independent variables, variables from four different subcategories in
accordance with the research discussed in the literature review section o f the study. To capture
the player’s on-field and personal characteristics into the model, six distinct variables were
created. GOLS, ASSISTS, and MINS are a player’s total goals scored, assists recorded, and total
minutes played respectively for the season preceding the transfer. FULLCAP is a combined
variable that is the total number of games played for their respective country’s national team and
youth national teams. All four o f these variables have hypothesized positive signs, as it is
believed that the more goals, assists and minutes a player has played, plus the greater experience
a player has gained through national team call-ups, the greater their market value in the transfer
market. Also in the player’s characteristics category are the variables AGE and AGESQ. These
variables represent the player’s age at the time the transfer was executed as well as the squared
value of the age. The squared value o f age is included in the model so as to allow for the nonlinear fit that is expected with age. Since a player typically increases in skill until reaching a
plateau at their maximum potential, at which point their expected returns begin to diminish, age
is best represented by a parabolic function, which is the result o f squaring age. For these two
variables there are contradictory hypotheses. AGE is expected to have a positive sign which
suggests that the transfer fee increases as age also increases, while AGESQ is expected to have a
negative sign. AGESQ being negative would suggest a negative parabola form which has its
stationary point at the y-value where a player’s market value has reached its maximum and
begins to decrease. The same theory holds true for the variables GOLSQ and FULLCAPSQ,
which are the squared values o f goals and national team appearances respectively. The two
variables are also hypothesized to have negative signs.
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In order to capture the effects o f both the buying club and selling club, a congruent list o f
variables for both team have been included into the model. The variables BCLP and SCLP
represent the clubs’ finishing positions in the league for the year prior to the transfer (1 being the
best possible finish and 40 being the worst). Since some players were transferred from teams that
were in the French Ligue 2 system, the variable allows for the continuation from Ligue 1
(positions 1-20) to Ligue 2 with the first place team being listed as 21 and the last place team
listed as 40. This technique has been used in prior studies to yield significant results (Dobson and
Gerrard, 1999; Carmichael and Thomas, 1993). Both BCLP and SCLP are hypothesized to have
negative values. For the buying club’s league position, as BCLP gets larger (note that the number
getting larger means the team finished in a worse position) it is hypothesized that the price o f the
transfer will be lower since the better teams have more money with which to make the expensive
transfer. Likewise for selling clubs, the relationship is expected to be negative as the better a
team ’s league position (smaller value) the more likely the team is to have better players that are
valued higher. Conversely, weaker teams are expected to be selling worse players who cost less.
To help capture the team s’ playing form the variables BCGD and SCGD have been included into
the model. These represent the goal difference (goals scored - goals allowed) for the two
respective teams in the season prior to the transfer. Both variables have hypothesized positive
signs for similar reasons. If the sign for BCGD is positive, this suggests that a team with a better
goal difference would pay more for the transfer o f a player, which holds consistent to the
research. Likewise, with a positive sign for SCGD, the better a team ’s goal difference, the higher
the cost o f the player, which is consistent with the theory that the better teams have more
expensive players. The last team variables are BCATT and SCATT, which are the respective
average attendance for games in the season prior to a player’s transfer. Earlier sections o f the
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paper discuss the change in team s’ revenues as a function o f increased television contracts,
merchandising and other soccer revenue. For the teams o f the LFP, yearly financial statements
are reported by the league on their website. Due to the fact that only the most recent three years
o f financial data are available, and the fact that some o f the teams do not report their revenue in
the standard manner, attendance has been deemed an appropriate proxy variable. Over a three
year time span, for the teams who had reported revenue, their average attendance and revenue
had a .89 correlation coefficient, which makes attendance a suitable proxy for financial success.
Both variables have hypothesized positive signs as buying clubs with higher average attendance
are expected to have higher income and a better team, and therefore can pay higher amounts for
better players. In response, selling clubs with higher attendance numbers are expected to be
better teams whose players can command a higher value. The respective squared terms for
attendance have been included into the final model in order to allow for a nonlinear fit for the
variables. These should have negative estimated coefficients.
The last variables included in the model are positional dummy variables which will
account for a significant difference in prices for any o f three different positions, forward,
midfield, and defense. For the variable FORDUM, a player receives a 1 if the player is a forward
and a 0 if the player is not, while for the variable MIDDUM, a player receives 1 if he is a
midfielder and a 0 for all other positions. It is difficult, in this situation, to hypothesize the
potential sign for the beta coefficient o f the positional dummy variables. In previous research
significant results were found between a player’s position and the price commanded for their
transfer. Dobson and Gerrard (1999) found that dummies for both forward and defense were
significant at the .05 level, which the beta coefficient for defense being larger than that o f
forward, suggesting that, ceteris paribas, a player who is a defender would have a higher market
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value than both a forward and a midfielder. However, in a different country and transfer market,
it is unclear as to how the different positions will be interrelated.

Table III

Table of Variable Definitions and Hypothesized Signs
Variable
GOLS
GOLSSQ
ASSISTS
MINS
FULLCAP
FULLCAPSQ
AGE
AGESQ
BCLP
BCGD
BCATT
BCATTSQ
SCLP
SCLPSQ
SCGD
SCATT
SCATTSQ
FORDUM
DEFDUM

Hypothesized
Sign
Definition of Variable
Number of goals scored in the season preceding the
+
transfer
GOLS squared.
+
Assists recorded in the season preceding the transfer
Minutes played in all competitions in the season preceding
+
the transfer, scaled by 10A-2
Total number of games played for senior and youth
+
national teams
FULLCAP squared
+
Age of the player at the time of the transfer
AGE squared
Finishing position of the buying club in the season
preceding the transfer (1st place=l, positions 1-40)
The goal difference for the buying club in the season
+
preceding the transfer (Goals For-Goals Against)
Average attendance for Ligue 1 games in season preceding
+
the transfer for the buying club, scaled by 10A-3
BCATT squared
Finishing position of the selling club in the season
preceding the transfer
+
SCLP squared
The goal difference for the selling club in the season
+
preceding the transfer
Average attendance for Ligue 1 games in season preceding
+
the transfer for the selling club, scaled by 10A-3
SCATT squared
?
1 if the player is a forward, 0 if not
?
1 if the player is a defender, 0 if not
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Due to the different roles o f players on the soccer pitch, certain positions obtain different
amounts o f in game playing statistics. Defenders, who stay mainly near their own goal in order to
protect the team from being scored against, rarely get the opportunity to score goals for their
team. When analyzing the goals variable, a defender should have on average a substantially
lower amount o f goals scored when compared to either forwards or midfielders, who are judged
on their scoring prowess. The same can be held true, but to a lower extent, for assists. Due to
this, it becomes hard to create a model that accounts for the differences in the standards created
for the different positions on a team, and could lead to a statistically less significant impact o f the
amount o f goals scored on the overall pricing o f a soccer player.
As was previously discussed in Section 2.2, the Bosnian ruling has had a lasting impact
on the transfer system in Europe. Due to the ruling, which created a free agent market for any
player whose contract has expired with their previous team, teams are now forced to trade
players earlier in the contracts in order to realize their market value without the risk o f the player
leaving the team for free at the end o f their contract. It can be believed that the amount o f time
left on a player’s contract would have a significant impact on the price received by the selling
club. As a player’s contract comes closer to ending, the reservation price set by the selling club
should lower so as to attract a buyer and to realize the value o f their player before the end o f the
contract. It is because o f this relationship that the amount o f years left on a contract should have
a positive beta coefficient with the lowest transfer fee being accepted at essentially nil.
Unfortunately, contract information for players remains classified information with a relatively
modest amount o f disclosed contracts. The addition o f this variable to the model could improve
its overall standing.
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Section 4
The final specification o f the model was tested using ordinary least squared regression
analysis and runs through numerous econometric tests to validate the robustness o f the model.
The following equation is the model specified by the regression output:

Y=α+β0+ β 1GOLS+ β 2GOLSSQ+ β 3ASSISTS+ β 4MINS+ β 5FULLCAP+ β

6FULLCAPSQ+ β 7AGE+ β 8AGESQ+ β 9BCLP+ β 10BCGD+ β 11BCATT+ β
12BCATTSQ+ β 13SCLP+ β 14SCLPSQ+ β 15SCGD+ β16SCATT+ β 17SCATTSQ
Results of Regression, Y=LNPRICE
Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

C

7.6879

3.2324

2.3784

0.0193

GOLS

0.0613

0.0324

1.8929

0.0613

GOLSSQ

-0.0030

0.0014

-2.1198

0.0366

ASSISTS

0.0473

0.0242

1.9550

0.0534

MINS

0.0300

0.0085

3.5057

0.0007

FULLCAP

0.0307

0.0082

3.7380

0.0003

-0.0005

0.0001

-3.9966

0.0001

0.4376

0.2577

1.6980

0.0927

AG ESQ

-0.0103

0.0051

-2.0136

0.0468

BCLP

-0.0354

0.0142

-2.4970

0.0142

BCGD

0.0099

0.0055

1.7999

0.0750

BCATT

0.0802

0.0185

4.3331

0.0000

BCATTSQ

-0.0010

0.0003

-3.1214

0.0024

SCLP

-0.0608

0.0308

-1.9758

0.0510

0.0013

0.0008

1.6732

0.0975

SCGD

-0.0063

0.0051

-1.2311

0.2212

SCATT

0.0662

0.0222

2.9823

0.0036

-0.0011

0.0004

-2.5253

0.0132

Variable

FULLCAPSQ
AGE

SCLPSQ

SCATTSQ

Prob.
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O f the seventeen variables included in the model a total o f sixteen have a statistically significant
impact on the change in transfer prices at the accepted .1 level or better. As shown in the table
below, the explanatory power, R2, was reported as .718, which suggests that the variables
included in the model account for about 72% o f the variation in transfer prices. The reported Fstatistic o f 14.72 rejects the null hypothesis for the model that the estimated coefficients are zero,
thus providing validation o f the coefficients.

Goodness o f Fit Statistics
R-squared

0.718587

Standard Error

0.616955

Adjusted R-squared

0.669771

F-statistic

14.72018

Diagnostic Test Statistics
Durbin-W atson stat

1.962244

W hite F-statistic
Ramsey RESET FStatistic

0.959217
0.426631

When testing the diagnostics o f the model, no abnormalities were found in the results. The
Durbin-Watson statistic o f 1.97 is well above the critical value which fails to reject the null
hypothesis that no serial correlation exists. Likewise, in observing the data, there exists no
evidence o f multicollinearity. The White test for heteroskedasticity provided an F-value o f .95,
which is well below the critical chi-square value, failing to reject the null hypothesis that the
model is homoskedastic. Lastly, the Ramsey RESET test for misspecification and omitted
variables returned an F-statistic that failed to reject the null hypothesis that there is not model
misspecification. Also, the addition o f the fitted variables was insignificant which reinforces the
lack o f error in the specification o f the model.
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For the variables concerning a player’s individual characteristics, all are significant at
the.05 level. GOLS and GOLSSQ are both significant with a negative sign on the squared term,
suggesting the negative nonlinear shape predicted in the theory section o f the study. ASSISTS
and MINS are significant at the .05and .01 level respectively, suggesting that the two variables
are better fit in a linear form, rather than goals which is best represented by a non-linear fit. The
variables FULLCAP and FULLCAPSQ are both significant at well beyond the .01 level with the
correct hypothesized signs. The inclusion o f this variable in the model shows the increasing
diversity in the French soccer leagues and the importance that national team experience at both
the youth and senior team levels has on the development o f a player in the eyes o f the
professional teams. The last player specific variables, AGE and AGESQ, are significant at the .1
and .05 levels respectively. The hypothesized signs o f positive and negative were present, thus
confirming the theorized nonlinear relationship between age and price.
When analyzing the results for the club characteristics portion o f the model, evidence o f
monopoly rents are found, as is the case in other studies o f this nature cited earlier in Section II.
The joint significance o f both buying and selling club variables reinforces the competition model
outlined in Dobson and Gerrard (1999) and Dobson et al. (2000), which states that the
significance o f buying team variables jointly with selling team ’s variables is evidence o f the
selling team ’s ability to extract a portion o f the nonnegative difference between their reservation
price and the maximum price a buying team is willing to pay. For the buying club both their
previous year’s league position (BCLP) and their goal differential from the previous year
(BCGD) are significant with the p-value for BCLP reported as .01 and BCGD as .07. The league
position coefficient has a negative sign which reinforces the theory that the better teams (best
league position = 1) are paying higher prices for the players ceteris paribus, but could also be
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seen as the better are also buying better, more expensive players. Goal differential has a positive
coefficient and follows the same theory as league position. BCATT and BCATTSQ are shown to
have an impact on the price o f a player with significance beyond the .01 level. The negative
coefficient follows the hypothesis that the better teams, with higher revenue from gate tickets,
are able to pay higher prices for the players with a nonlinear fit. For the selling club, two o f the
three variables are shown to have significance; with the significant variables, SCATT and SCLP,
found to have a nonlinear relationship. The significance o f both squared terms shows a nonlinear
relationship with the dependent variable, the natural logarithm o f the transfer price. Lastly, when
constructing the model, dummy variables were included to test for the impact that a player’s
position has on their market value; however these variables are excluded from the final model
due to a lack o f statistical significance.

Section 5

This study expanded upon previous research in showing that many o f the variables and
theories surrounding English transfer markets hold true for the French sector o f the transfer
market. On a macro level, transfer fees have been on the rise around the world driven by
increased investment in soccer teams, increased revenue for the teams due to a boom in
television contracts, and merchandising revenue. Superstars are commanding higher prices and
the elite teams are competing for the same limited skilled capital, thus raising the prices globally.
The competitive disparity between the best teams and the rest o f the league has led to a top heavy
league, with the same teams winning the vast majority o f the titles and gaining the highest
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revenues each year. This trend, when combined with the continuing rise in revenue for the top
teams, has led to a rise in transfer prices around the market.
The micro aspect o f the study generated a model that was able to account for around 72%
o f the variation in the transfer price o f a player when transferred between French teams.
Variables for a player’s on-field abilities and characteristics were shown to have a significant
impact on the player’s transfer price. Evidence o f monopoly rents were found in the joint
significance o f variables for both the buying and selling club. Overall the model provides a high
level o f explanatory power, and provides a model which is capable o f estimating the transfer
value o f an individual player.
Future research on the subject is possible as there remains a portion o f the variation o f
transfer prices that is not explained by the current model. As explained in Section III o f the
study, the inclusion o f the years left in a player’s contract would likely be a significant factor due
to the Bosman ruling. Other playing variables could provide an even clearer look into the
valuation o f player’s by professional teams. Likewise, financial disclosure, which is a growing
trend in FIFA due to new legislation called Fair Play, could provide increased explanatory power
for the model. It is hypothesized that the profit for a team for the previous year and potentially
for several lagged years could have an effect on the price paid by a team. Lastly, the model did
not include goalkeepers. This unique position, with distinct judging criteria, was unable to be
placed in the same model as field players. This could allow for another study that derives a
model for the transfer price o f goalkeepers.
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